Small States Likewise Possess Autonomy and Agency

LKYCIC
DATE
12 July 2026

Lianhe Zaobao, 陈庆珠:小国同样拥有自主权与能动性

 

(Translation)

 

This morning, Minister Chee Hong Tat first described, from a macro perspective, the changes in the global order, and also touched on sustainable development, population ageing, artificial intelligence, and their impact on the workforce and our lives. In this dialogue, I will shift the focus to geopolitics. I have only five minutes to set out four points, so please allow me to be brief.

 

In recent years, especially over the past two years, one of the greatest changes we have witnessed is that the rules-based world order is breaking down. What has followed is the weakening of multilateralism and the role of the United Nations.

 

At the same time, hard power is making a comeback. Many scholars and observers have pointed out that today’s world has become one in which “might makes right”. This is clearly visible in many global situations. The mechanisms of the open world order that safeguarded our security and prosperity over the past 80 years are being eroded. Recently, even sea lanes have faced threats. Must we pay a “toll” to pass through waterways of great strategic significance? An unstable world affects all of us, and those most deeply affected are small and medium-sized countries.

 

As a small country, Singapore needs a rules-based order and multilateralism in order to survive and prosper. Protectionism is rising, and countries are pursuing their own interests. Such behaviour has become more overt—although countries have always put their own interests first, today’s practices are more undisguised. In addition, nationalism is also rising in various countries. This is my first point.

 

My second point is that an order led by the two superpowers, the United States and China—a “Group of Two”, or G2—is emerging. Although Chinese officials, diplomats and leaders have all stated that China has no intention of becoming a member of a G2, because China does not want to become a hegemonic country like the United States, I have in fact heard a highly respected Chinese diplomat, now a scholar and university professor, say that if China does not want to become part of a G2, then the so-called G2 does not exist. Indeed, one participant alone cannot form a G2. But what I want to say is that, whether China is willing or not, the G2 exists in substance, because this is how the world views US-China relations.

 

This arrangement is not as formal or institutionalised as the Group of Seven, or G7, but the G2 exists as a functional reality. Everyone is closely watching the meeting between the heads of state of China and the United States in Beijing, and when people heard that the summit would take place, and that another summit would be held in the future, everyone breathed a sigh of relief. I hope this can proceed smoothly in September, and that there will be other meetings between the two sides afterwards. Any decision between China and the United States will have far-reaching effects on other parts of the world. If US-China relations remain stable, this can create more room and opportunities for other countries to respond. Even if China rejects the G2 label, I believe every country is thinking: what kind of major power will China become in the future?

 

China is a rising, and perhaps already fully formed, superpower. But what kind of power will you become? I think China’s scholars and policymakers are themselves also considering: what kind of major power should we become? We do not want to repeat the mistakes of the United States, so how exactly should we position ourselves? I believe China itself is also working through and answering this question.

 

Naturally, we hope to see China demonstrate a willingness to abide by United Nations rules and uphold multilateral space. China has joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP, and has applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP. These are all very positive signals. On many occasions, China has advocated the core principles of the United Nations. In Southeast Asia, we indeed hope that China can properly resolve the South China Sea issue. Although the differences among the parties remain considerable, let us work together towards this objective. If negotiations cannot be completed this year, perhaps we can strive to complete them when Singapore holds the rotating ASEAN chairmanship in 2027. This is my second point.

 

My third point is the rise of middle powers. Today, people are all talking about the emergence of middle powers. Apart from the two superpowers, China and the United States, all other countries are either middle powers or small countries. These middle powers include India, whose population has surpassed China’s; Canada, which has an extensive territory and a population of about 41 million; Japan, which has a small territory but a population of 120 million; and Australia, which has a vast territory but a population of only about 20 million to 30 million. It can therefore be seen that middle powers differ greatly in form.

 

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney proposed that middle powers should unite, an initiative that inspired many people. However, can these middle powers truly come together?

 

This is difficult to imagine, because their interests and demands differ. For example, there are enormous differences among Brazil, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, the key question is on which issues they can reach consensus. I think the traditional allies of the United States, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, may be able to come together. As for the other middle powers, they will form alignments according to their own interests.

 

Therefore, “middle powers” is a very good concept. Carney’s idea is to use a union of middle powers to balance the superpowers, thereby seeking a more cooperative path. I hope this can become a reality. This is the third point: changes in the global situation are prompting middle powers to work towards moving to the forefront.

 

My fourth point is from Singapore’s perspective. Small countries such as Singapore are not powerless, and we will not sit and wait helplessly. We possess autonomy, and Singapore has always been actively exercising and making use of this initiative and agency. We work hard to open up a path for ourselves.

 

Whenever a crisis occurs, Singapore is always able to reposition itself. The facts have shown that we are able to diversify our trade relationships and conclude new trade agreements. We have even established the Future of Investment and Trade Partnership, or FIT-P. This is a cooperative corridor connecting countries including New Zealand, Costa Rica and Chile, and extending to Africa, rather than a traditional free-trade agreement. Within this area of cooperation, countries undertake to maintain policy predictability in investment rules, trade rules and supply chains. This is of great significance.

 

Therefore, small countries likewise possess their own autonomy and agency.

 

  • The author is Singapore’s Ambassador-at-Large and Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew Centre for Innovative Cities, Singapore University of Technology and Design. This article is the text of her remarks delivered on 6 July at the eighth Singapore–China Forum organised by Lianhe Zaobao, during the session “Changes in the Global Order and the Emerging Landscape”.